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Abstract
Transactive microgrids are emerging as a transformative solution
for the problems faced by distribution system operators due to an
increase in the use of distributed energy resources and a rapid ac-
celeration in renewable energy generation, such as wind and solar
power. Distributed ledgers have recently found widespread interest
in this domain due to their ability to provide transactional integrity
across decentralized computing nodes. However, the existing state
of the art has not focused on the privacy preservation requirement of
these energy systems – the transaction level data can provide much
greater insights into a prosumer’s behavior compared to smart meter
data. There are specific safety requirements in transactive microgrids
to ensure the stability of the grid and to control the load. To fulfil
these requirements, the distribution system operator needs transac-
tion information from the grid, which poses a further challenge to
the privacy-goals. This problem is made worse by requirement for
off-blockchain communication in these networks. In this paper, we
extend a recently developed trading workflow called PETra and de-
scribe our solution for communication and transactional anonymity.
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1 Introduction
Transactive energy models have been proposed as a set of market
based mechanisms for balancing the demand and generation of en-
ergy in communities [8, 15, 20]. In this approach, customers on the
same feeder (i.e. sharing a power line link) can operate in an open
market, trading and exchanging generated energy locally. Distribu-
tion System Operators can be the custodian of this market, while still
meeting the net demand [9]. Blockchains have recently emerged as
a foundation for enabling the transactional service in the microgrids.
For example, the Brooklyn Microgrid (brooklynmicrogrid.com) is a
peer-to-peer market for locally generated renewable energy, which
was developed by LO3 Energy as a pilot project. Similarly, RWE,
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and Grid Singularity have developed blockchain based solutions
for incentivizing neighbors to sell excess energy to the grid and
payments for electric car charging However, those solutions do not
address the requirements for off-blockchain communication network
and the requirements for privacy.
Specifically, while blockchains provide the necessary ledger ser-
vices, we still need a communication network for sending control
commands from the DSO to the prosumers as well as initiating
the trade matching mechanisms. Additionally, this communication
network and the blockchain itself must preserve the privacy of the
prosumers. Energy usage patterns (actual or predicted) are sensitive,
personally identifiable data. Legal requirements and security con-
siderations make it mandatory to provide a mechanism to hide the
identities and transaction patterns of trade partners. Additionally,
solutions must also satisfy security and safety requirements, which
often conflict with privacy goals. For example, to prevent a prosumer
from destabilizing the system through careless or malicious energy
trading, a transactive grid must check all of the prosumer’s transac-
tions. In a decentralized system, these checks require disseminating
information, which could be used to infer the prosumer’s future
energy consumption.
In [16], we introduced Privacy-preserving Energy Transactions
(PETra), which is our distributed-ledger based solution that (1) en-
ables trading energy futures in a secure and verifiable manner, (2)
preserves prosumer privacy, and (3) enables distribution system op-
erators to regulate trading and enforce the safety rules. In this paper,
we extend the communication and transaction anonymity mecha-
nisms. The key contributions of this paper are (a) a survey of the key
concepts required for implementing the anonymity across the two
dimensions, (b) a discussion on the threats that must be considered
when we implement the anonymization mechanisms, and lastly (c) a
discussion on implementing the anonymization extensions in PETra.
The outline of this paper is as follows. We first present an overview
of the PETra workflow described in [16] in Section 2. We then dis-
cuss the communication anonymity extensions in Section 3.1 and
transaction anonymity in Section 3.2. Section 3.1.2 discusses the
threat vectors for the communication anonymity approach. Section
3.2.3 describes the transaction anonymity threats. Finally, we pro-
vide concluding remarks in Section 4.
2 Privacy-preserving Energy Transactions
There is a systematic pattern emerging in the domain of Internet of
Things which requires transactional capabilities. Examples include
transactive ride-share systems [35], transactive health-care systems
[2], and transactive energy systems described earlier in this section.
As shown in Figure 2, there are three separate layers of this trans-
action. The first layer is the distributed ledger, which is responsible
for keeping track of all log of all events of interest; in the energy
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Figure 1. The sequence of activities in PETra. The red arrows show off-block chain communication and blue arrows show transactions on
block-chain. Producers and consumers request the DSO to allocate the energy production and consumption assets to blockchain. The consumers
receive asynchronous notification about offers from producers. Thereafter, they can finalize transaction. The energy transfer happens at a later
time and is also recorded in the chain. Financial transactions are also done on the blockchain. These financial transactions are later tallied with
the energy transactions.
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Figure 2. Components of IoT Blockchain pattern. Typically the IoT
devices communicate with each other over a messaging middleware
(red arrows). They also communicate with blockchain and smart
contracts (blue arrows) through clients, for example the Ethereum
geth client. The miners are entities responsible for validating the
events/transactions.
domain these events are trades, energy transfer and financial trans-
actions. In case of health care domain, the events record the time
of access of the health care data. The data itself is not stored in the
block-chain due to the size and privacy issues. Rather, the data is
stored in the second layer, which can be implemented by either a
cloud or a decentralized storage service like Storj1. The third layer
is the IoT layer, which is responsible for sensing and control. This
third layer is typically implemented using messaging middlewares
like MQTT, DDS, etc.
1https://storj.io/
The key aspect of this pattern is the tight integration of distributed
messaging patterns between actors and the blockchain-based com-
munication network used for transferring transactional information.
For example, in the transactive energy domain, PETra, described in
[16], involves the interactions between distribution system operator,
prosumer, and a smart contract. The smart contract is responsible for
keeping track of the energy and financial assets enabling prosumers
to post trade offers and exchange assets when another prosumer
decides to accept.
The algorithm of PETra uses quantised energy asset tokens2 that
can represent the non-negative amount of power to be produced or
consumed (for example, measured in watts), the time interval in
which energy is to be produced (or consumed) and the last time
interval in which energy is to be produced (or consumed) (Figure 1
describes the full sequence of activity). These assets are withdrawn
and submitted to anonymized accounts on behalf of prosumers by the
distribution system operator, which is also responsible for validating
that the specific prosumer has the energy capacity for feasible trades
given the assets. Once the DSO posts the assets into the blockchain,
prosumers can trade between themselves using these quantised as-
sets and anonymized addresses, hiding their identity from each other.
The DSO is also responsible for releasing and managing the transfer
of currencies, which are represented by financial assets, which is
simply an unsigned integer value, denominated in a fiat currency. In
this workflow, there are both on- and off-blockchain communications
between DSO and prosumer. The off-blockchain communication is
required to request the transfer of assets. On-blockchain communi-
cation occurs via filters that track the posting of assets. Similarly,
prosumers also communicate which each other via blockchain to
2There are two kinds of energy tokens: Energy Production Asset and Energy Consump-
tion Asset. Token attributes include power and time interval for which the token is
valid.
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indicate when an offer has been posted and when a transaction has
cleared.
While all of the transactive IoT systems require communication
and transactional anonymity there are domain-specific requirements
and challenges that must be considered. These characteristics and
requirements guide us in the description of the anonymization archi-
tecture that we describe in the rest of this paper. Specifically, these
characteristics are as follows: (1) transactions in a microgrid must
clear in bounded time and any errors must be detected3, (2) typically,
there is a dedicated communication channel available in a microgrid
that connects the prosumers and the distribution system operator,
(3) the set of participants in the network are fixed and known ahead
of time. Thus, a discovery procedure is typically not required, and
(4) even though all the transactions are anonymous there is still a
need for maintaining associativity of properties like maximum gen-
eration capacity4, reputation scores to prosumers as they participate
in trades to maximize the likelihood of success, while reducing the
likelihood of jeopardizing the stability of the microgrid5. In the
next two sections, we describe the mechanisms for implementing
communication and transaction anonymity in this workflow.
3 Communication and Transactive Infrastructure
3.1 Communication Anonymity
The anonymous communication layer is the infrastructure upon
which all other anonymity services in PETra are built. The goal of
communication anonymity is to allow smart meters and users to
exchange transactions and bids without revealing their IP-addresses
or other information which can be used to identify them. In almost
all cases, at the very least the Internet Service Provider (ISP) has
information about the users’ communications and identities. The
goal of this section is to maximize the anonymity to such an extent
that not even ISPs can identify users. Existing protocols for low-
latency communication anonymity include onion routing [25] or the
similar garlic routing [18], STAC [14] and the decentralized Matrix
protocol.6 In this section, we present a brief survey of onion and
garlic routing, especially with respect to application in PETra.
3.1.1 Onion and Garlic Routing
Onion routing is based on messages in communication being encap-
sulated in multiple layers of encryption and sent through a number
of nodes in a network, called onion routers. It is anonymous be-
cause no single node, except for the sender and the receiver, can
know the origin and the recipient of the message. In Figure 3, an
example shows how smart meter A encrypts a message m, with
final destination G, through a network of onion routers. A encrypts
the message, for example a confirmation of an energy purchase, a
certain number of times, along with addresses of members of the
onion network. Each subsequent node, selected by the sender and
specified in the different layers of encryption, decrypts one layer
using its private key, revealing the next node to which the encrypted
message is forwarded. Finally, the second to last node reveals the
3Energy trades that have an impact on real-time control (e.g., selling energy production
for the near future) must be permanently recorded on the ledger in time since grid
control signals cannot be delayed.
4To prevent destabilization of the grid, a producer should not be allowed to bid more
than its maximum generation capacity.
5A prosumer with low reputation score might have a history of not fulfilling the energy
transfer obligations
6Open-federated protocol for instant messaging, Voice-over-IP and IoT communications
(https://matrix.org/).
Figure 3. The principle behind onion and garlic routing. The differ-
ence being that in onion routing, m is a single message, whereas in
garlic routing, m is multiple messages packaged together.
address of smart meter G and sends the still encrypted message to G,
who can decrypt it safely. No single node in the network, except for
the sender, knows how many times the packages is re-routed, and
no node except for the sender and recipient can know their internal
position in the chain of routing. Another technique for communica-
tion anonymity is called garlic routing. It differs from onion routing
in that multiple messages are encrypted together to counter tracing
attacks.
In practice, the deployment of onion routing (or a variant thereof
called garlic routing) in the Invisible Internet Project (I2P) works
as follows. Each node in the network operates an I2P router, allow-
ing for anonymous communications. A router is distinct from an
endpoint application in that it is not a secret who runs a router. By
contrast, an application is the destination for the communications
and is anonymous. This disconnect allows for a higher degree of
anonymity. To communicate between routers, unidirectional tunnels
are set up. The tunnels use layered encryption, meaning that each
router in the tunnel only can decrypt one layer. In order to transmit
a message between two routers, the sender needs to know where to
direct the message, i.e. what the address of the entry point of the
receiver is.
The I2P protocol differs from regular network communications
in that, for communications to take place between routers, each
router needs to know a structure called the RouterInfo. It contains
the 2048-bit ELGamal encryption key, a signing key, a certificate,
timestamp, text field, signature of bundle and the contact addresses
where a router can be reached. The RouterInfo is given along with
something called a LeaseSet, containing a group of tunnel entry
points for a particular client destination, when the tunnel will expire,
the destination itself, encryption key for end-to-end encryption of
garlic messages, revocation key and a signature of the LeaseSet data.
The LeaseSet identifies an application on the I2P network. The I2P
protocol ensures the anonymity of its users because of the disconnect
between the identities of the applications communicating over the
network, and the identities of the routers. This metadata is stored in
a distributed directory called the netDb, based on the Kademlia P2P-
protocol, which describes a provably consistent and fault-tolerant
distributed hash table. [19] The RouterInfo and LeaseSet data are
stored on the netDb under the key derived from the SHA256 of the
destination.
3.1.2 Threat Vectors in Onion and Garlic Routing
Murdoch and Danezis [23] show that a low-cost traffic analysis is
possible of the Tor-network, theoretically and experimentally. Traffic
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analyses are based on tracking the forwarding of the size of a data
package between computers, for example, if computer A sends a
package of exactly 42 bytes to computer J, who then sends a pack-
age of exactly 42 bytes to B, it can be easily deduced that A sent a
package of unknown content to computer B. This is possible because
of the distribution of metadata to all routers in the Tor-network [13].
In what is called a timing analysis attack, an attacker tries to find
a correlation between the timing of messages moving through the
network to gain information about user identities and their com-
munications. Analyses have shown that these types of attacks can
be very effective over a wide range of network parameters when
specific defences are not employed [17, 34]. To counter timing anal-
ysis attacks, the I2P network bundles multiple messages together
(principle of garlic routing) and renders it more difficult to anal-
yse [18]. Schimmer, 2009, showed that the bandwidth opportunistic
peer-selection and -profiling algorithm does not prioritize anonymity
in favor of performance [30]. Herrmann and Grothoff, 2011, exposed
a potential weakness in anonymous HTTP-hosting done over the
I2P network [12]. The arguably only practical attack against the I2P
network was done against the directory, the netDb, by Egger et al.
[10]. An improvement of the protocol, aimed at Egger et al.’s attack
was suggested by Timpanaro et al., 2015 [32].
Another potential weakness of onion routing and garlic routing is
that, even though the actual message is encrypted and the destina-
tions are unknown, there is always a trace of the communication at
the ISP level. The fact that a connection took place will be logged
and is openly visible at the very least to the ISP. This attack can be
countered in PETra by each node transacting and participating in
the mixing network, regardless of the need for trading at that time.
Trading of “zero”-assets can help obfuscate the non-zero-assets of
others. Another liability in onion and garlic routing can be that the
legitimacy of the sender can not be immediately verified. This can
be achieved by the techniques described in the section Transaction
Anonymity.
3.1.3 Proposed Solution
Given the survey of the previous paragraphs, performing P2P energy
trading in transactive grids over a garlic routing network protocol
such as the I2P network provides a high amount of communication
anonymity for users. Only part of the energy trading in PETra will be
anonymized by garlic routing, namely the internet connections. PE-
Tra is no different from other network communications in that aspect.
The particularity of the trading being local and thus IP-addresses
being close, is a potential weakness that can be countered by creating
“fake” IP-addresses. To apply garlic routing to transactive microgrids,
the smart meters, prosumers, and DSO can act as onion routers, and
distribution of available routers is done over netDb. In practice, this
service can be built on the free and open-source I2P software with
private Directory Authorities. In this case, anonymous communi-
cation identifiers in bids and asks correspond to public-keys that
identify I2P applications.
3.2 Transaction Anonymity
Communication anonymity is necessary but not sufficient for anony-
mous trading, as the cryptographic objectives of authentication and
legitimacy are not fulfilled. We suggest using cryptographic tech-
niques from distributed ledgers, blockchains and cryptocurrencies.
The most adopted of which is the Bitcoin blockchain and currency.
It allows for very simple digital cash spending but has serious pri-
vacy and anonymity flaws [1, 3, 26]. Additionally, Biryukov and
Pustogarov, 2015, show that using Bitcoin over the Tor network
opens an entirely new attack surface [4]. Solutions to the tracing and
identification problems identified by these researchers have been
proposed and implemented in alternative cryptocurrency protocols:
mixing using ring signatures and zero-knowledge proofs. [21, 33]
3.2.1 Mixing Through Ring Signatures
The CryptoNote protocol prevents tracing assets back to their origi-
nal owners by mixing together multiple incoming transactions and
multiple outgoing transactions. This service thus hides the connec-
tions between the prosumers and the anonymous addresses. Mixing
requires the possibility to create new wallets at will, something that
is generally recommended upon any cryptocurrency transfer and it
requires the existence of a sufficient number of participants in the
network. These protocols enable participants to mix assets with each
other, thereby eliminating the need for a trusted third party. Mon-
ero is an example of a cryptocurrency that provides built-in mixing
services by implementing the CryptoNote protocol. [24] There are
however alternative implementations of mixing protocols such as
CoinShuffle [28] or Xim [5].
The CryptoNote protocol achieves two objectives:
1. Untraceable transactions - for each incoming transaction all
possible senders are equiprobable.
2. Unlinkable transactions - for any two outgoing transactions
it is impossible to prove they were sent to the same per-
son [33].
Group signatures were first introduced by Chaum and van Heyst,
1991, [7] and then built upon by Rivest et al., 2001. [27] The basis
for anonymity in the CryptoNote protocol, however, is a slightly
modified version of the Traceable ring signature algorithm by Fuk-
isaki and Suzuki, 2007. [11] The algorithm allows a member of a
group to send a transaction in such a way that it is impossible for a
receiver to know any more about the sender than that it came from a
group member without the use of a central authority.
Unlinkability is achieved by one-time ring signatures, making use
of four algorithms: GEN, SIG, VER, LNK. The general principle
of the unconditional unlinkability is that a sender signs a transaction
using a public key and a key image generated by GEN and produces
a one-time ring signature using SIG and the public key pair and key
image. SIG makes use of a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
which the verifier(s) then use to check the signature in VER. If the
signature is valid, the verifier checks if the key image has been used
in previous transactions, which mean that the same secret key was
used to produce multiple signatures. She does that by running the
algorithm LNK. Assuming that the mapping of the secret key to the
key image is a one-way injection, it is certain that: A. The signer
is not identifiable by way of recovering the secret key from the key
image. B. The signer cannot create another key image with the same
secret key.
Additionally, if the receiver and sender have randomly gener-
ated, unique and new addresses, the Diffie-Hellman protocol can
be used to generate a new pair of public-private keys. This is how
untraceability of public keys is achieved. The sender should gener-
ate ephemeral keys for each transfer, enabling only the receiver to
recover the corresponding private key. As an illustrative example, in
Figure 4, a schematic diagram shows households A, B and C signing
a transaction since they are part of the same ring. A ring would,
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in reality, be many more households, not necessarily of the same
microgrid. Let’s assume that A is the true origin of the transaction.
When E receives the transaction, the only thing that E can know
with certainty is that one of A, B or C initiated the transaction. To in-
crease the transaction anonymity further, a second, third or n rounds
of ring signatures can be algorithmically imposed upon the network.
With each round of signing parties, the group of potential origins
grows linearly. Notably, the ring signature algorithm by Fujisaki and
Suzuki, [11], has been published in a peer-reviewed paper. This can
be compared favorably to many cryptocurrency protocols which are
simply published as white papers without any formal review-process.
[33] In practice, a transaction using the mixing service should be
performed in the following way to ensure anonymity:
It is also possible for household A that it paid prosumer B for
energy by either disclosing the random number used in the genera-
tion of the one-time public destination key used in that transaction
to B. Or she can use any other kind of zero-knowledge protocol to
prove she knows the random number. The ring signatures would
also allow the auditing of transactions by, for example, the DSO.
This would be achieved by prosumer B giving the tracking key or
truncated address to the DSO, who would then be able to link all
incoming transactions to B.
3.2.2 Mixing through Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) are ways for a person to prove the
knowledge of some specific fact to a verifier, without actually hav-
ing to disclose the knowledge. Blum et al. provided non-interactive
ZKPs (NIZK) in 1988 [6], where the prover and verifier don’t have
to interact or communicate directly with each other. The Zerocoin
protocol [21] outlines a way how NIZKs can achieve the untraceabil-
ity objective of the previous section and it ensures that no double-
spending is allowed.7 Zerocoin is a protocol for the decentralized
mixing of coins, so that they can not be traced, or tainted. However,
senders and destinations can still be identified. [21] Luckily, Zero-
cash [29] extends the NIZK functionality to allow for anonymous
transactions, anonymous balances and coins, improved performance
of transactions and sending of assets to a receivers fixed address
without action required from the receiver. Zerocash makes use of
a more efficient version of the NIZK, used in Zerocoin, called ZK
Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARK).
The Zerocash-scheme could be carried out using a simple mes-
saging board, but would not be safe in practice since information
might be manipulated or the owner of said board might collude etc.
Therefore, an immutable, decentralized data storage, governed by the
consensus of its peers is required to assure the secure transmission
of information. The blockchain provides such a structure.
3.2.3 Threats and weaknesses in Ring Signature- and
Zero-Knowledge Proof-schemes
When applying either ring signatures or zero-knowledge SNARKs
to PETra, potential weaknesses or attacks need to be considered.A
potential threat to ring signatures is when a large amount of the
unspent transactions are owned by an adversary or when insufficient
amounts of signatures are included in a ring. When a prosumer A
wishes to select a group of signatures to sign her transaction as well,
then it is likely that she will select many of the transactions from
the adversary. Assuming the adversary spends his outputs without
7Each coin in the protocol is identified uniquely by a serial number.
Figure 4. Visualization of untraceability in ring signatures in smart
meter-based energy trading and the potential deductions of origin of
the transaction by a single household in the chain of signatures.
mixing8, then A’s transaction is exposed as well. [31] Recent re-
search also show that up to 65% of Monero transactions are trivially
traceable using one attack. They also exposes two more attacks that
have been amended in the latest versions of the protocol, lowering
the amount of transactions traceable to 20%. [22, 31]
One of the main weaknesses of the Zerocash-based protocol is
that for each private transaction, a costly zk-SNARK needs to be
computed. But that is not a threat to anonymity, just a practical
reason why it might be difficult to run the scheme over a congested
public blockchain. In [29], experiments show an average time of 3
min to create the zk-SNARK for a private transaction, verifying it
takes only 8.5 ms. Another large practical drawback of Zerocash is
the lack of programmability and functionality that would be required
in PETra. Zhang et al. solve some of the practical flaws and amend
security issues. [36]
3.2.4 Proposed Solution to Achieve Transaction Anonymity
Applying the CryptoNote protocol to PETra could be done by per-
forming both energy transactions and monetary transactions using
ring signatures. They would be securely logged, tamper-proof and
anonymous through the usage of a blockchain. Even though some
security flaws exists, as seen in the previous paragraph, the risk of
identification, linking or tracing of transactions can be minimized by
imposing a high minimum number of signatures per transaction. We
also propose to connect the global transaction networks to augment
the number of transactions and thereby limit the chance of deduction
by elimination.
Applying ZKPs to PETra would require that a smart meter can
encrypt and sign a transaction, transmit a proof of it to the blockchain
and thus the receiver of the payment, without having to reveal the
actual amount of energy or cost incurred to anyone but the receiver.
This is achieved by the Zerocash-protocol and is implemented as a
fork of the Bitcoin blockchain. Neither the receiver, nor any other
participants can gain information about the transactions sent over the
blockchain. To provide full functionality for PETra, the Zerocash-
protocol would need to be implemented for the transmission of bids
and asks as well as the already existing monetary transactions. The
second implementation would need to be modified to transmit and
link bids and asks to the payments ledger. A more straightforward but
bloated structure would be to create transactions without monetary
8The number of other signatures used in the ring.
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value to post a bid or an ask and then directly reference the final
bid-/ask-transaction in the payment-transaction.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
Through the use of garlic routing and ring signatures, complete
communication and transaction anonymity is achieved. A garlic
routing network such as I2P can ensure that no usage, bid, ask or
identifiable data is leaked from the system. By using ring signatures,
transactions cannot be traced, but it can still be proven that a bid or an
ask has been responded to and that a transaction has taken place. The
design we’ve proposed anonymizes the whole chain of transactions,
both on a network communication layer and on a distributed ledger
transaction layer.
As for the DSO, it receives the same information from the smart
meter as in a non-transactive smart grid (i.e., amount of energy pro-
duced and consumed). In particular, since price policies are recorded
on the ledger (which the smart meters may read), each prosumer’s
smart meter may calculate and send the prosumer’s monthly bill to
the DSO, without revealing the prosumer’s energy consumption or
production. The DSO still gets aggregate information regarding load
on the grid, but cannot identify individual users and their energy
prosumption.
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